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1ANoncooperative n-person Fractional Metagame
$n$ (M$GP$)
$(N, X, f_{1}., g_{1}., G^{i}, S^{i})$ (1.1)
. ,
1. $N:=\{1,2, \cdots, n\}$ , $i$ $i=1,2,$ $\cdots,$ $n$
.
2. $E$ , $i\in N$ $X_{\dot{l}}\subset E$ $x$:
. $X:= \prod_{i=1}^{n}X_{i}$ , $X\ni x=(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n})$ $n$
, (multistrategies) .
3. $i\in N$ , $f_{i}$ : $Xarrow R_{+}\cup\{0\},$ $g_{i}$ : $Xarrow R_{+}$ . , $R_{+}=(0, \infty)$
.
4. $i\in N$ , $G^{i}=L\mathit{9}\cdot..\cdot$ , $G^{:}$ (MGP) $i$
.
5. $i\in N$ , $S^{i}$ : $X^{\hat{\dot{\iota}}}arrow 2^{\mathrm{x}_{:}}$ $\text{ }$ (M$GP$) $i$
(decision rule) , $S:=\Pi_{\dot{|}=1}^{n}S^{i}$ .
2ANoncooperative Parametric $n$-person Metagame
Definition 2.1 $\overline{x}\in X$ (M$GP$) consistent ,
$\forall i\in N$, $x_{i}\in S^{i}(x^{\hat{i}})$ (2.1)
.
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$\epsilon$-social equilibrium point .
Definition 22 $\epsilon>0$ , $\overline{x}=(\overline{x}_{1}, \cdots,\overline{x}_{n})\in X$ (M$GP$) $\epsilon$-social
equilibrium point (for short, $\epsilon$-s.e.p.) , $i\in N$ ,
$\overline{x}_{i}\in S^{i}(\overline{x}^{\hat{i}})$ , and $G^{i}( \overline{x})<\inf_{y_{i}\in S(\overline{x}\dot{\cdot})}\dot{.}G^{i}(y_{i},\overline{x}^{\hat{i}})+\epsilon$ (2.2)
.
, $\overline{x}^{\hat{i}}$ $\overline{x}^{\hat{i}}=(\overline{x}_{1}, \cdots,\overline{x}_{i-1},\overline{x}_{i+\dot{1}}, \cdots,\overline{x}_{n})$ .
(MGP) $\epsilon$-s.e.p. . , ,
( , ) ,
, $i\in N$ $f_{i}$ , $g$:
, . (M$GP$)
$(MGP_{\theta})$ , $(MGP_{\theta})$ , (MGP)
$\epsilon$-s.e.p. . $\cdot$
, (MGP) $\text{ }$ $(MGP_{\theta})$ .
$(N,X, f_{i},g_{i}, \theta_{i}, F_{\theta}^{i}.\cdot, S^{:})$ (2.3)
,
1. $N:=\{1,2, \cdots, n\}$ .
2. $E$ , $X_{i}\subset E$ $i\in N$ , , $X:=$
$\prod_{i=1}^{n}X_{i}$ .
3. $i\in N$ , $f_{i}$ : $Xarrow R,$ $g_{i}$ : $Xarrow R_{+}$ .
4. $i\in N$ $\theta_{i}$ : $X^{\hat{i}}arrow R_{+}$ , $\theta:=(\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}, \ldots, \theta_{n})$ : $\Pi_{i}X^{\hat{i}}arrow R_{+}^{n}$
$(MGP_{\theta})$ . , $X^{i}:=\Pi_{j\neq i}X_{j}$ .
5. $i\in N$ , $F_{\theta}^{i}.\cdot:=f_{i}-\theta_{i}g_{i}$ : $Xarrow R$ $(MGP_{\theta})$
$i$ . , $x\in X$ $F_{\theta}^{i}\dot{.}(x)=f_{i}(x)-\theta_{i}(x^{\hat{i}})g_{i}(x)$
.
6. $i\in N$ , $S^{i}$ : $X^{\hat{i}}arrow 2^{\mathrm{x}_{:}}$ $(MGP_{\theta})$ $i$
(decision rule) , $S:=\Pi_{i=1}^{n}S^{i}$ .
Definition 23 $\overline{x}=(\overline{x}_{1}, \cdots,\overline{x}_{n})\in X$ $(MGP_{\theta})$ social equilibrium point (for
short, s.e.p.) , $i\in N$ ,
$\overline{x}_{i}\in S^{i}(\overline{x}^{\hat{i}})$ , and $F_{\theta}^{i}\dot{.}(\overline{x})=$ $\inf_{\wedge,y:\in S^{i}(\overline{x})}.\cdot F_{\theta}^{i}.\cdot(y_{i},\overline{x}^{\hat{i}})$ (2.4)
$= \inf_{y:\in S\dot{\cdot}(\overline{x})}\dot{.}\{f_{i}(y_{i},\overline{x}^{\hat{i}})-\theta_{i}(\overline{x}^{\hat{i}})g_{i}(y_{i},\overline{x}^{\hat{i}})\}$ (2.5)
.
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, $i\in N$ $\varphi_{i}$ : $X\cross Xarrow R$ .
$\varphi_{i}(x, y)=F_{\theta_{i}}^{i}(x)-F_{\theta_{i}}^{i}(y_{i}, x^{\hat{i}})$
$=f_{i}(x)-f_{i}(y_{i}, x^{\hat{i}})-\theta_{i}(x^{\hat{i}})(g_{i}(x)-g_{i}(y_{i}, x^{\hat{i}}))$ , $\forall(x, y)\in X\cross X$.
, $\varphi$ : $X\cross Xarrow R$ .
$\varphi(x, y)=\sum_{i=1}^{n}\varphi_{i}(x, y)$ , $\forall(x, y)\in X\cross X$ . (2.6)
Lemma 2.1 .
Lemma 2.1 (1),(2) .
(1) $\overline{x}\in X$ $(MGP_{\theta})$ s.e.p. .
(2) $y\in S(\overline{x})$ I
$\varphi(\overline{x}, y)\leq 0$, and $\overline{x}\in S(\overline{x})$ .
Proof. (1) $\Rightarrow(2)$ , $\overline{x}\in X$ $\text{ }$ s.e.p. , Definition 23
$\varphi$ .
(2) $\Rightarrow(1)$ , $i\in N$ , $y=(y_{i},\overline{x}^{\hat{\dot{\iota}}})$ . , $\varphi(\overline{x}, y)\leq 0$
,
$\varphi_{i}(\overline{x}, y)+\sum_{j\neq i}\varphi_{j}(\overline{x}, y)\leq 0$
(2.7.)
. ,
$\sum_{j\neq i}\varphi_{j}(\overline{x}, y)=\sum_{j\neq i}\{f_{j}(\overline{x})-f_{j}(y_{j},\overline{x}^{\hat{j}})-\theta_{j}(\overline{x}^{\hat{j}})(g_{j}(\overline{x})-g_{j}(y_{j},\overline{x}^{\hat{j}}))\}$
$= \sum_{j\neq i}\{f_{j}(\overline{x})-f_{j}(\overline{x}_{j},\overline{x}^{\hat{j}})-\theta_{j}(\overline{x}^{\hat{j}})(g_{j}(\overline{x})-g_{j}(\overline{x}_{j},\overline{x}^{\hat{j}}))\}$
( $j\neq i$ , $\overline{x}=(\overline{x}_{j},\overline{x}^{\hat{j}})=(y_{j},\overline{x}^{\hat{j}})$)
$= \sum_{j\neq i}$
{fj(x-)-fj(x-)-\mbox{\boldmath $\theta$}j(x- $(g_{j}(\overline{x})-g_{j}(\overline{x}))$ }
$=0$ .
$\varphi_{i}(\overline{x}, y)\leq 0$ , $\varphi_{i}$ , $\overline{x}\in X$ $(MGP_{\theta})$
s.e.p. .
Lemma 22 $X$ , $K$ $X$ ,
$S$ : $Karrow 2^{K}$ & $\mathrm{u}.\mathrm{h}.\mathrm{c}$ . , nonempty, convex, closed-values . ,
$\varphi$ : $X\cross Xarrow R$ (1),(2) $,(3)$ .
(1) $\forall y\in K$ , $x-*\varphi(x, y)$ ; .
(2) $\forall x\in K$, $y\vdash+\varphi(x, y)$ ; .
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(3) $\forall y\in K$, $\varphi(y, y)\leq 0$ .
, $M$ .
$M= \{x\in K|\alpha(x):=\sup_{y\in S(x)}\varphi(x, y)\leq 0\}$ (2.8)
$\overline{x}\in K$ , .
$\overline{x}\in S(\overline{x})$ , and $\sup\varphi(\overline{x}, y)\leq 0$ . (2.9)
$y\in S(\overline{x})$
Lemma 22 , [5] .
Theorem 2.1 $i\in N$ , $X_{i}\subset E$ ,
$S^{i}$ : $X^{\hat{i}}arrow 2^{x_{:}}$ , $\mathrm{u}.\mathrm{h}.\mathrm{c}.,$ $1.\mathrm{s}.\mathrm{c}$ . , nonempty, convex, closed-values .
, $f_{i},$ $g_{i},$ $\theta_{i}$ (1), (2) $,(3)$ .
(1) $f_{i}$ : $Xarrow R_{+}\cup\{0\},$ $X$ $X_{i}$ .
(2) $g_{i}$ : $Xarrow R_{+},$ $X$ $X_{i}$ .
(3) $\theta_{i}$ : $X^{\hat{i}}arrow R_{+}\cup\{0\},$ $X^{\hat{i}}$ .
$\overline{x}\in X$ .
$\overline{x}\in S(\overline{x})$ , and
$\sup_{y\in S(\overline{x})}\varphi(\overline{x}, y)\leq 0$
. (2.10)
, $\overline{x}$ , $(MGP_{\theta})$ s.e.p. .
Proof. $i\in N$ $X_{i}\subset E$ , $X= \prod_{i=1}^{n}X_{\dot{l}}$
. (1) (2) , $y\in X$ $\varphi_{i}(\cdot, y)$ $X$ , $\varphi(\cdot, y)$
$X$ , Lemma 22 (1) . , $f_{i},$ $g_{i}$ $X_{i}$
, , $\theta_{i}$ : $X^{\hat{i}}arrow R_{+}$ , $x\in X$ , $\varphi(x, \cdot)$
$X$ , Lemma 22 (2) . , $y\in X$
, $\varphi(y, y)=0$ ,
$\sup_{y\in X}\varphi(y, y)=0$ ,
. , $S$ , $S$ u.h.c. , nonempty, convex, closed-values
. ,
$M= \{x\in K|\alpha(x):=\sup_{y\in S(x)}\varphi(x,y)\leq 0\}$ (2.11)
, $M$ . , Lemma 22 , $\overline{x}\in X$
.
$\overline{x}\in S(\overline{x})$ , and
$\sup_{y\in S(\overline{x})}\varphi(\overline{x}, y)\leq 0$
. (2.12)
, Lemma 2.1 , $\overline{x}\in X$ $(MGP_{\theta})$ s.e.p. .
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3An $\epsilon$-Equilibrium Point of $n$-person Fractional Metagame
$(MGP_{\theta})$ $\theta$ , $i\in N$ $\overline{\theta}_{i}$
.
$\overline{\theta}_{i}(x^{\hat{i}}):=\underline{\inf_{y\in X}}\dot{.}G^{i}(y_{i}, x^{\hat{i}})$ , $\forall x\in X$ . (3.1)
, $G^{i}(y_{i}, x^{\hat{i}})=f.\Delta^{y}.\dot{.}\hat{\dot{\Delta}}^{x},\cdot$ . , $\overline{\theta}:=(\overline{\theta}_{1},\overline{\theta}_{2}, \cdots,\overline{\theta}_{n})$ .
$g.\cdot(y:,x):$
, $(MGP_{\theta})$ (M$GP$) $\epsilon$-s.e.p. .
$\epsilon>0$ , $i\in N$ , $\overline{\theta}_{i}^{\mathit{6}}:=\overline{\theta}_{\dot{l}}+\epsilon$ . ,
$\overline{\theta}_{i}^{\mathit{6}}(x^{1}\hat{.}):=\overline{\theta}_{i}(x^{\hat{\dot{\iota}}})+\epsilon$ , $\forall x\in X$ , (3.2)
, , $\overline{\theta}_{\xi}:=(\overline{\theta}_{1}^{\epsilon}, \cdots,\overline{\theta}_{n}^{\mathcal{E}})$ .
Definition 3.1 $\overline{x}=(\overline{x}_{1}, \cdots,\overline{x}_{n})\in X$ (MGPff,) s.e.p. ,
$i\in N$ ,
$F_{\mathit{5}^{\mathcal{E}}}^{i}. \cdot(\overline{x})=\inf_{y:\in S^{}(l\hat{)}}\dot{.}F\frac{\dot{l}}{\theta}.\cdot\epsilon(y:,\overline{x}^{\hat{i}})$ (3.3)
$= \inf_{y:\in S(l^{\hat{j}})}\dot{.}\{f_{\dot{\iota}}(y_{i},\overline{x}^{1}.)-(\overline{\theta}.(\overline{x}^{1}.)+\epsilon)g_{\dot{\iota}}(y_{\dot{*}},\overline{x}^{1}.)\}\wedge.\wedge\wedge$ (3.4)
.
Theorem 3.1 $\epsilon>0$ , $\overline{x}=(\overline{x}_{1}, \cdots,\overline{x}_{n})\in X$ $\text{ }$ $(MGP\sigma,)$ s.e.p.
, $\overline{x}\in X$ $\text{ }$ (M$GP$) $\epsilon$-s.e.p. .
Proof. $i\in N,$ $x\in X$ [ , $\overline{\theta}_{i}(x^{\hat{\dot{\iota}}})+\epsilon>\overline{\theta}_{i}(x^{\dot{l}})$ ,
$0> \inf_{y:\in S(x)}.\cdot\hat{.\cdot}F_{\mathit{5}^{\mathcal{E}}}^{i}.\cdot(y_{1}., x^{1}.)\wedge$ . (3.5)




, $\overline{x}$ (MGP) $\epsilon$-s.e.p. .
Lemma 3.1 $i\in N$ $X_{i}\subset E$ , $f_{\dot{\iota}},$ $g_{i}$ (1), $(2)$
.
(1) $f_{i}$ : $Xarrow R_{+}\cup\{0\},$ $X$ .
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(2) $g_{i}$ : $Xarrow R_{+},$ $X$ .
, $i\in N$ , $\overline{\theta}_{i}^{\xi}$ : $X^{\hat{i}}arrow R_{+}$ $X^{\hat{i}}$ .
Lemma 3.1 , [8] .
Theorem 32 $\epsilon>0$ , $i\in N$ , $X_{i}\subset E$
$S^{i}$ : $X^{\hat{i}}arrow 2^{\mathrm{x}_{:}}$ u.h.c., l.s.c. , nonempty, convex, closed-values
. $f_{i},$ $g_{i}$ (1),(2) .
(1) $f_{\dot{\iota}}$ : $Xarrow R_{+}\cup\{0\},$ $X$ $X_{i}$ .
(2) $g_{i}$ : $Xarrow R_{+},$ $X$ $X_{:}$ .
$\overline{x}\in X$ .
$\overline{x}\in S(\overline{x})$ , and
$\sup_{y\in S(X)}\varphi(\overline{x}, y)\leq 0$
. (3.7)
, $\overline{x}$ , (M$GP$) $\epsilon$-s.e.p. .
Proof. $i\in N$ , $\varphi^{\mathit{6}}|$. : $X\cross Xarrow R$ .
$\varphi_{i}^{\mathcal{E}}(x, y):=F\frac{i}{\theta}.\cdot\epsilon$ (x)–I $(y_{i}, x^{\hat{i}})$
$=f_{\dot{l}}(x)-f_{\dot{l}}(y_{\dot{\iota}}, x^{1}.)-(\overline{\theta}_{i}(x^{\hat{i}})+\epsilon)(g_{\dot{\iota}}(x)-g_{i}(y_{i}, x^{\dot{l}}))\wedge$ , $\forall(x, y)\in X\cross X$ .
, $\varphi^{\xi}$ : $X\cross Xarrow R$ .
$\varphi^{\epsilon}(x, y)=\sum_{i=1}^{n}\varphi_{i}^{\mathit{6}}(x, y)$ , $\forall(x, y)\in X\cross X$ . (3.8)
$i\in N$ $X_{i}\subset E$ , $X= \prod_{1=1}^{n}.X_{\dot{l}}$ .
(1) (2) , $\varphi_{i}^{\epsilon}(\cdot, y)$ $X$ , $\varphi^{\mathit{6}}(\cdot, y)$ $X$ , Lemma 22
(1) . , $f_{i},$ $g_{i}$ $X_{\dot{l}}$ , , $\overline{\theta}_{i}^{\epsilon}$ :
$X^{\hat{i}}arrow R_{+}$ , $\varphi^{\mathcal{E}}(x, \cdot)$ $X$ , Lemma 22 (2)
. { , $y\in X$ { , $\varphi^{\mathcal{E}}(y, y)=0$ ,
$\sup_{y\in X}\varphi^{\mathit{6}}(y, y)=0$ ,
. , $S$ u.h.c. , nonempty, convex, closed-values
. , $M$ (2.11) , Theorem 2.1
, $M$ . , Lemma 22 , $\overline{x}\in X$ .
$\overline{x}\in S(\overline{x})$ , and $\sup\varphi(\overline{x}, y)\leq 0$ . (3.9)
$y\in S(\varpi)$
{ Lemma 2.1 , $\overline{x}$ $(MGP_{\overline{\theta}}\epsilon)$ s.e.p. . Theorem 3.1 ,
$\overline{x}$ (M$GP$) $\epsilon$-s.e.p. .
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